India at the SCO Coordinators’ Meeting in Islamabad: Multilateralism, Pakistan and the Türkiye Question

Pakistan announced this week that it will host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in August 2027, even as an Indian delegation led by a senior External Affairs Ministry official attended a preparatory meeting of SCO National Coordinators in Islamabad. It is the first official Indian visit to Pakistan since Operation Sindoor last year. The three-day meeting began on Monday, days after India and Pakistan traded sharp allegations on terrorism and Kashmir at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

India was represented by Joint Secretary (Multilaterals and Economic Relations) Alok Dimri, a higher level than at other meetings under Pakistan’s 2026-27 chairship. In mid-September, the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure meeting in Islamabad was attended only by India’s Chargé d’affaires. Indian officials insist that the coordinators’ meeting was held in a multilateral format and carries no bilateral significance, yet it leaves open the path for higher-level participation at ministerial meetings and the Heads of Council meeting to which Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been invited.

The topic is important for UPSC because it tests an aspirant’s understanding of how India balances its security posture towards Pakistan with its stake in Eurasian multilateralism, and how the entry of new members such as Türkiye may alter the grouping’s dynamics.

Background and Context

Five Important Key Points

• Pakistan chairs the SCO for 2026-27 under the theme “Turning Vision into Action: Connectivity, Innovation and Shared Prosperity”, and will host the Heads of State Summit in August 2027.
• India’s participation at Joint Secretary level in Islamabad is the first such official visit since Operation Sindoor, though officials describe it as purely multilateral.
• Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said Türkiye will seek a higher level of engagement than its present observer status, hinting at a full membership request next year.
• India rejected Mr. Erdogan’s reference to Kashmir in his UNGA speech, while the Ministry of External Affairs said any membership question must be decided collectively by SCO members.
• India has thus far avoided leaders’ meetings of the SCO in both Delhi and Islamabad, having hosted the 2023 Heads of Council Summit virtually.

The SCO: Origins and Structure

The SCO evolved from the Shanghai Five of the 1990s, which resolved border and confidence-building issues among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and was formally established in 2001 with Uzbekistan. India and Pakistan became full members in 2017 at the Astana Summit, Iran joined in 2023 and Belarus in 2024, making a ten-member grouping. The Council of Heads of State is the supreme body, supported by the Council of Heads of Government, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the National Coordinators and the Secretariat in Beijing. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) at Tashkent handles security cooperation. The SCO is often described as an organisation that works by consensus, which gives each member an effective veto and makes its declarations lowest-common-denominator documents.

India’s Strategic Interests in the SCO

India joined the SCO to engage Central Asia, a region it considers its extended neighbourhood, to counter-balance Chinese influence through an inclusive forum, and to secure a platform for its concerns on terrorism. The “Connect Central Asia” policy of 2012 sought to deepen energy, connectivity and cultural links, although India lacks direct land access because of Pakistan. India has used the SCO to press for language on cross-border terrorism, and in 2025 it declined to sign a defence ministers’ joint text that omitted specific reference to the Pahalgam attack, while the later Tianjin declaration condemned that attack. India also refuses to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative because the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, violating its sovereignty.

The Bilateral Overhang

India’s ties with Pakistan remain frozen after the Pahalgam attack, Operation Sindoor and the placing of the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance in 2025. Participation in Islamabad therefore involves a careful calculation: staying away entirely would cede space to China and Pakistan inside a body of which India is a full member, while attending at a high level would signal normalisation that New Delhi does not intend. India’s approach of a mid-level official in a multilateral format is a calibrated middle course. Earlier precedents include Prime Minister Modi hosting the 2023 Council of Heads of State virtually, and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar attending the 2024 Heads of Government meeting in Islamabad, when he made it clear that the visit was not about bilateral talks.

The Türkiye Factor

Türkiye is a dialogue partner and has sought deeper ties with the SCO. India’s discomfort arises from Ankara’s close alignment with Pakistan, including its defence cooperation and repeated references to Kashmir at the UN. New members are admitted by consensus, so India could in principle block Turkish membership, but the Ministry of External Affairs has avoided a categorical position, saying only that it is for members to decide collectively. This restraint reflects India’s wish to avoid being seen as a spoiler in an organisation where China and Russia attach value to expansion. The outcome will depend on how Indian diplomacy weighs its bilateral relations with Türkiye against wider SCO equities.

Regional Security Context

The meeting occurs against the backdrop of the Iran war and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, with Iran now an SCO member, and of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Energy security, connectivity through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar port are all affected. Afghanistan remains a shared security concern, with the SCO having a dormant contact group. China’s growing influence in South Asia, along with the emerging Russia-China-Pakistan convergence, tests India’s ability to shape the agenda.

Bihar Connection

Bihar has a direct interest in West Asian stability, since a large number of its workers are employed in Gulf economies and remit substantial sums home; disruption in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz affects households across districts such as Siwan, Gopalganj and Saran. Bihar is also the cradle of Buddhism, and Bodh Gaya, Rajgir and Nalanda link India to Central Asia, China and Mongolia through shared Buddhist heritage; SCO-linked cultural and tourism cooperation can therefore be a soft-power avenue for the State. Increased regional connectivity and energy security would also benefit Bihar’s fertiliser and power sectors.

Comparative Perspective

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also brings together rival states, such as Vietnam and China, and manages differences through consensus and non-interference. The SCO has similar features but has a stronger security orientation. The Quad and BRICS illustrate India’s multi-alignment, in which it participates in groupings with divergent strategic orientations. Unlike ASEAN, the SCO lacks effective mechanisms to resolve bilateral disputes among members, as the India-Pakistan and China-India differences show.

Way Forward

India should continue to attend technical and coordinators’ meetings, retaining the principle that multilateral participation is distinct from bilateral engagement. It should use the SCO’s platform to insist on a strong, unambiguous counter-terrorism text and to press for operationalising the RATS against terror financing. Diplomacy should pursue connectivity through Chabahar and INSTC as an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative. On Türkiye, India should build a coalition of members, including Russia and Central Asian states, that emphasise consensus and respect for sovereignty. Finally, India should deepen bilateral outreach to Central Asian republics on energy, pharmaceuticals, digital public infrastructure and skilling, so that its SCO role is grounded in tangible partnerships.

Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations

UPSC: GS-II (India and its neighbourhood, groupings and agreements involving India, bilateral and regional groupings, effect of policies of other countries on India); Essay (multilateralism versus bilateralism). SSC: International organisations (SCO members, headquarters at Beijing, RATS in Tashkent, founding year 2001). Key terms: Shanghai Five, SCO-RATS, National Coordinators, Council of Heads of State, observer versus member, Connect Central Asia, CPEC, INSTC, Chabahar, consensus principle.