On March 14, 2026, 193 Members of Parliament belonging to the INDIA bloc formally submitted a notice in both Houses of Parliament seeking the removal of Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Gyanesh Kumar. This marks a historic first — no such notice has been formally submitted in Parliament before against a sitting CEC. The 10-page document lists seven charges against Mr. Kumar, ranging from partisan and discriminatory conduct in office to deliberate obstruction of the investigation of electoral fraud and mass disenfranchisement. The Trinamool Congress, which spearheaded the effort, has also been considering releasing a transcript of its delegation’s meeting with the Election Commission on February 2, wherein Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee had publicly alleged that the CEC had humiliated her delegation.
The significance of this development extends far beyond a political confrontation between the Treasury benches and the Opposition. It strikes at the heart of India’s constitutional arrangement for securing the independence and impartiality of the body that conducts elections — the world’s largest democratic exercise. The Election Commission of India (ECI) is constitutionally mandated to supervise, direct, and control the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice President. If the presiding officer of this body is perceived as acting in a partisan manner, the legitimacy of election outcomes itself comes under a cloud.
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For UPSC aspirants, this issue is of exceptional analytical importance. It intersects constitutional provisions under Articles 324 to 329, the Judges (Inquiry) Act of 1968, the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Conditions of Service) Act, 1991, and the recently enacted Election Commission (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Act, 2023. The controversy also highlights deeper structural questions about how independent constitutional bodies can be insulated from executive overreach — a recurring theme in GS-II and the Essay paper.
Table of Contents
Background and Context: Five Important Key Points
- The removal of a Chief Election Commissioner is governed by Article 324(5) of the Constitution, which provides that the CEC shall not be removed from office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court.
- Under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, a removal motion requires at least 100 signatures in the Lok Sabha and 50 in the Rajya Sabha; the current notice exceeds these thresholds with 130 signatures in the Lok Sabha and 63 in the Rajya Sabha.
- The Opposition’s specific charges include partisan conduct during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, which they allege disproportionately targets non-BJP voters in States like West Bengal and Bihar.
- In 2023, the Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India directed that the appointment of Election Commissioners must involve a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India, departing from the earlier practice of executive-only appointments; Parliament subsequently enacted the 2023 Act, omitting the CJI from the committee.
- If the removal motion is admitted in both Houses, a joint committee must be constituted by the Lok Sabha Speaker and the Rajya Sabha Chairman, and until an inquiry is completed, no committee of inquiry may be constituted.
Constitutional Architecture: Article 324 and the Independence of the Election Commission
Article 324 of the Constitution vests the superintendence, direction, and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of all elections in the Election Commission of India. The founding fathers were acutely aware that a constitutional body responsible for determining who enters Parliament must be shielded from political pressure. Hence, Article 324(5) provides that the CEC can only be removed in the same manner as a Supreme Court judge — through an address by both Houses of Parliament. This is a deliberate parallel to the removal of superior court judges under Article 124(4), underscoring the gravity of the process and its intended rarity.
The protection afforded to the CEC is asymmetric, however. While the CEC enjoys removal protection equivalent to a Supreme Court judge, other Election Commissioners do not enjoy equivalent constitutional protection — a lacuna the Supreme Court noted in Anoop Baranwal. This asymmetry was compounded by the 2023 Act, which removed the Chief Justice of India from the appointment panel, prompting critics to argue that the executive has retained dominant influence over the selection of commissioners.
The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and Procedural Requirements
The procedure for removal under the Judges (Inquiry) Act is elaborate and deliberately slow, ensuring that removal motions are not weaponised frivolously. Once a notice is submitted in both Houses on the same day, no inquiry committee may be constituted unless the motion is admitted in both Houses. Once admitted, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha must jointly constitute a three-member committee, comprising a sitting Supreme Court judge, a sitting Chief Justice of a High Court, and a distinguished jurist. The committee investigates whether the charges are proved and whether the conduct warrants removal. Only upon the motion being passed by both Houses by a special majority can the President issue the removal order.
The procedural rigour is instructive: even if the INDIA bloc has the requisite numbers to sign the motion, it does not have a majority in either House to pass the address. The practical effect of the notice is therefore political and symbolic — placing the CEC under public scrutiny and signalling to the constitutional ecosystem that the Opposition regards the conduct of the election authority as compromised.
The Special Intensive Revision Controversy
The immediate trigger for the removal motion is the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, which the ECI launched in select States. The Opposition claims that the SIR is being conducted in a manner designed to disenfranchise voters from communities that traditionally support non-BJP parties, with West Bengal, Bihar, and other States cited as examples. The Trinamool Congress has alleged that its delegation was publicly humiliated by the CEC when it raised these concerns, a charge that, if substantiated, would represent a serious breach of institutional dignity.
The SIR is a legitimate and legally sanctioned exercise — the ECI is constitutionally empowered to conduct intensive roll revisions to ensure accuracy and currency of electoral rolls. The controversy lies not in the legal authority but in the manner of implementation and the alleged discretionary targeting of specific constituencies or demographics.
Comparative Dimension: Electoral Body Independence Globally
The question of how to insulate electoral management bodies from political capture is a global governance challenge. In Australia, the Australian Electoral Commission is led by a retired judge and is strictly non-partisan. In Canada, the Chief Electoral Officer cannot be a member of any political party and is removed only through an address of both Houses of Parliament. South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission is constitutionally entrenched with appointments made through a transparent panel process involving Parliament and civil society.
India’s situation reveals a structural vulnerability: while the removal procedure is stringent, the appointment procedure — even after Anoop Baranwal — retains a numerical majority in favour of the executive within the selection committee. This means that the independence of the ECI in practice depends critically on the personal integrity of the appointed commissioners, rather than on the structural design of the institution.
Governance Concerns and Institutional Trust
The broader governance concern is about institutional credibility. Elections are the foundational ritual of Indian democracy. If a significant section of the political class and electorate perceives the election management body as biased, the legitimacy of election outcomes becomes contested, potentially escalating post-election disputes and deepening political polarisation. The ECI has historically enjoyed considerable public trust — its conduct of the 2004 elections, which produced a surprise result, and its consistent enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct are testaments to its institutional credibility.
The present controversy, regardless of its eventual outcome, has the effect of chipping away at this credibility. Even if the removal motion fails — as it almost certainly will given numerical realities — the public discourse it generates places scrutiny on the ECI that may ultimately serve a salutary function, compelling the institution to be more transparent about its operational decisions.
Way Forward
India urgently needs a structural overhaul of the ECI’s appointment framework. The composition of the selection committee must genuinely exclude executive dominance; including the CJI, as the Supreme Court directed, or at least replacing one executive nominee with an independent jurist or Comptroller and Auditor General, would be a significant improvement. The removal procedure should also be complemented by mid-term accountability mechanisms, such as mandatory appearances before a Parliamentary Standing Committee, not for decisions on specific cases, but for broad institutional oversight. The ECI should also proactively publish detailed methodology notes for exercises like the SIR, enabling public verification and reducing the space for allegations of partisan intent.
Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations
GS Paper II: Indian Constitution — Constitutional bodies, Election Commission of India, Articles 324-329, Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968. Also relevant to Governance and Accountability. Essay Paper: Independence of Constitutional Institutions in India. SSC Topics: Indian Polity — Election Commission, constitutional articles, constitutional remedies. Key terms to remember: Article 324(5), Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968, Anoop Baranwal judgment 2023, Special Intensive Revision (SIR), Election Commission (Appointment) Act 2023.