The military conflict that began on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched coordinated air strikes on Iran, has escalated dramatically through March 2026 into one of the most significant geopolitical crises of the decade. Israeli strikes on Iran’s South Pars gas field — one of the largest known gas reservoirs in the world, shared between Iran and Qatar — triggered Iranian retaliatory missile attacks on energy infrastructure in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel. The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately one-fifth of globally traded oil passes, has been effectively shut by Iran, sending Brent crude prices to $114 per barrel and causing widespread disruption to global energy supply chains.
For India, this conflict presents a multi-dimensional challenge of the highest order. India has 22 vessels earmarked for evacuation from the Strait of Hormuz, including 20 assessed as critical to the country’s energy security. Prime Minister Modi has been engaged in an intensive diplomatic outreach, speaking with leaders of France, Qatar, Jordan, Malaysia, Oman, and External Affairs Minister Jaishankar has spoken with UAE and Israeli counterparts. India’s diplomatic response, including its notable shift from condemning only Iranian attacks to now calling for the cessation of attacks on “civilian infrastructure across the region,” signals a careful recalibration of its strategic messaging.
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This issue is of paramount importance for UPSC aspirants because it encapsulates nearly every dimension of India’s foreign policy: energy security, diaspora welfare, maritime security, multilateral diplomacy through BRICS and SCO, non-alignment principles, and the management of relationships with geopolitically opposed partners simultaneously.
Table of Contents
Background and Context: The Strategic Geography of the Strait of Hormuz
Five Important Key Points
- The Strait of Hormuz, at its narrowest approximately 33 kilometres wide, is the world’s most critical oil chokepoint, through which passes nearly one-fifth of globally traded oil and 20 percent of global LNG exports including from Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, which was struck by Iranian missiles in March 2026.
- India has 60 mmscmd of its 195 mmscmd total natural gas consumption routed through the Strait of Hormuz, and 47 percent of its LNG imports originate from Qatar alone, making the Hormuz closure an acute energy security crisis.
- India has been engaged in direct diplomatic negotiations with Tehran to secure safe passage for 22 India-bound vessels, with maritime intelligence firms reporting that at least one Indian LPG carrier was allowed through an unusual route close to Iranian territorial waters following payment of approximately $2 million to Iranian authorities per vessel.
- The conflict has created a diplomatic contradiction within BRICS (which India chairs in 2026) — as both Iran and the UAE are members but hold opposing positions, preventing India from forging a consensus BRICS statement, in contrast to the SCO (which includes Iran but not UAE) which issued a statement condemning strikes on Iran as early as March 2.
- India’s declaratory position has evolved significantly — from co-sponsoring a UN Security Council resolution condemning only Iranian attacks to now explicitly calling for an end to attacks on “civilian energy infrastructure across the region,” reflecting both India’s growing concern about economic consequences and its desire to maintain channels of communication with all parties.
India’s Energy Diplomacy and the Hormuz Negotiation
India’s approach to securing vessel passage through the Hormuz Strait reveals the complex operational reality of energy diplomacy. According to maritime intelligence firm Lloyd’s List Intelligence, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval forces and port authorities are assessing vessels individually before permitting passage, with India having established a direct communication channel with Tehran following Prime Minister Modi’s call with Iranian President Pezeshkian on March 12. The process was paused following Israeli strikes on South Pars, illustrating the fragility of diplomatic arrangements in an active conflict zone.
The fact that India has “earmarked” 20 vessels as critical to its energy security is itself significant — it signals both the depth of India’s dependence on Gulf energy flows and the extent of the operational planning that accompanies India’s energy security architecture. India must now confront the question of whether its reliance on any single chokepoint for energy imports represents an unacceptable strategic vulnerability.
India’s Diplomatic Posture: Strategic Autonomy Under Stress
India’s foreign policy has traditionally been characterised as maintaining “strategic autonomy” — the capacity to engage with multiple power centres without binding alliance commitments. The Iran-Israel-US conflict stress-tests this posture acutely. India has deep economic relationships with the Gulf states (which host approximately 9 million Indian workers and are sources of significant remittances), maintains civilisational and energy ties with Iran, has a growing strategic partnership with Israel (particularly in defence and technology), and simultaneously seeks to manage its relationship with the United States, which is both a primary security partner and the lead protagonist in the conflict.
India’s decision to not publicly condemn US-Israeli strikes on Iran — even while calling for restraint — reflects this balancing act. However, India’s co-sponsorship of a UNSC resolution condemning Iranian attacks without equally condemning the initial US-Israeli strikes drew criticism and may have complicated its diplomatic positioning with Tehran. The subsequent shift in MEA’s language to include condemnation of attacks on “civilian energy infrastructure across the region” suggests an acknowledgment that India’s earlier messaging was insufficiently balanced.
BRICS, SCO, and the Limitations of Multilateralism
The conflict has exposed the structural limitations of multilateral forums in which India participates. BRICS, which India chairs in 2026, includes both Iran and the UAE as members. Their directly opposed positions on the conflict have made consensus impossible. The SCO, which includes Iran but not the UAE, was able to issue a statement on March 2 condemning strikes on Iran. These contrasting outcomes reveal that India’s multilateral diplomacy is most effective in forums where its partners share convergent interests, and that the expansion of BRICS to include geopolitically opposed members has reduced, rather than enhanced, the forum’s policy utility.
This has important implications for India’s multilateral strategy. The diversification of India’s partnership portfolio — through the Quad, SCO, BRICS, and bilateral strategic partnerships — provides diplomatic flexibility but can also create contradictions that require careful management.
FTA Negotiations and the Economic Collateral Damage
The conflict has also delayed India’s Free Trade Agreement negotiations with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Israel, both of which had just commenced in February 2026. The India-GCC FTA, launched on February 24, is now indefinitely delayed. The India-Israel bilateral FTA, which had its first round of negotiations in late February 2026, is similarly on hold. Meanwhile, the India-UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, signed in July 2025, is on track for implementation by May 1, 2026. The differential impact of the West Asia crisis on India’s various trade negotiations illustrates how geopolitical events can reshape the trade policy landscape.
Way Forward
India must accelerate the diversification of its energy import basket, reducing dependency on the Hormuz corridor through greater LNG imports from Australia and the United States. The government should urgently expand the Strategic Petroleum Reserve capacity and invest in pipeline connectivity with alternative suppliers where feasible. On the diplomatic front, India should utilise its unique positioning as a country with dialogue channels with all parties — including Iran, Israel, the US, and Gulf states — to actively facilitate back-channel communication and contribute to de-escalation. India’s chairmanship of BRICS in 2026 provides a platform for articulating a Global South perspective on energy security and the humanitarian costs of geopolitical conflict.
Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations
This topic falls under UPSC GS-II (International Relations) — specifically India’s Foreign Policy, India’s Relations with neighbouring countries and Gulf states, and India’s participation in multilateral forums. It is also relevant for GS-III (Energy Security, Impact of External Sector on Domestic Economy) and Essay Paper.
For SSC examinations, key areas include India’s foreign policy, Strait of Hormuz, BRICS, SCO, energy security, and India-Gulf relations.
Key terms: Strategic autonomy, Strait of Hormuz, Hormuz chokepoint, India-GCC FTA, BRICS, SCO, LNG, South Pars, Lloyd’s List Intelligence, energy security, MEA.