The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in New Delhi, chaired by India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, concluded on May 16, 2026, not with a joint statement but with a 63-paragraph Chair Statement — a significant distinction that signals the depth of disagreement within the grouping over the West Asia conflict. The meeting, held under India’s BRICS Presidency for 2026 (with the Summit scheduled for September 10–11), exposed a fundamental fault line: Iran and the UAE, both BRICS members since the 2023 Johannesburg expansion, are effectively in a state of military conflict with each other — the US-Israeli war with Iran having begun on February 28, 2026, with the UAE closely aligned with the US-Israel axis.
Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, in an exclusive interview with The Hindu, characterised this tension as proof of BRICS’s importance rather than its weakness: “This is also the richness of this grouping, because you have this place and the space to negotiate and talk.” His optimistic framing — that BRICS will reach a common position by the September Summit — reflects both diplomatic hope and the enormous challenge India faces as the host of a deeply fractured multilateral forum.
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For UPSC aspirants, this development is essential for understanding: the evolution and transformation of BRICS from a Goldman Sachs economic concept to a geopolitical grouping; the challenges of multilateral consensus in a multipolar world; India’s strategic interests and diplomatic balancing within BRICS; and the intersection of regional conflicts with global institutional architecture.
Background and Context: BRICS — From Economic Concept to Geopolitical Institution
Five Important Key Points
- BRICS originated as a Goldman Sachs economic categorisation in 2001 (initially BRICs — Brazil, Russia, India, China), became an intergovernmental forum with the first BRIC Summit in 2009, and expanded to BRICS with South Africa’s inclusion in 2010, evolving from an economic grouping to one with explicit geopolitical ambitions.
- The Johannesburg Summit of 2023 saw the historic expansion of BRICS to include Iran, UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia — nearly doubling the grouping and fundamentally transforming its composition, but also introducing members with sharply divergent foreign policy orientations.
- BRICS members now represent approximately 40% of the world’s population, about 30% of global GDP (PPP), and over 40% of the world’s land surface, giving the grouping substantial economic and demographic weight even if its institutional coherence remains limited.
- India’s BRICS Presidency in 2026 comes at a particularly challenging moment: the West Asia conflict, the Iran-UAE confrontation within the grouping, and Donald Trump’s threats of 100% tariffs on BRICS members for de-dollarisation initiatives all create pressure on India’s diplomatic management.
- The distinction between a “Joint Statement” and a “Chair Statement” is diplomatically crucial: a joint statement requires consensus of all members, while a chair statement represents only the host country’s summation — the inability to produce the former signals significant disagreement within BRICS on West Asia.
BRICS began as a discussion forum among the world’s major emerging economies. The original five members — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa — represented a diverse grouping united primarily by the shared aspiration to reform global governance institutions: the UN Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. Over time, concrete institutional architecture emerged: the New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2014 with headquarters in Shanghai and a mandate to fund infrastructure in developing countries; and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a $100 billion emergency liquidity mechanism.
The 2023 Johannesburg expansion fundamentally altered BRICS’s character. With Iran and the UAE now both members — countries that are effectively in opposing camps in the West Asia conflict — the assumption of shared geopolitical orientation has been shattered. EAM Jaishankar’s statement that new BRICS members must understand and follow the consensus of old members reflects the tension between the aspirational inclusivity of BRICS expansion and the practical difficulties of maintaining consensus in a larger, more diverse grouping.
The West Asia Fault Line Within BRICS
The West Asia conflict that began on February 28, 2026, represents the most acute challenge to BRICS’s internal coherence since its founding. Iran — now a BRICS member — is directly engaged in military conflict with the US-Israeli coalition, with a fragile ceasefire in place since April 8. The UAE — also a BRICS member — is closely aligned with the US and has historically had complex relations with Iran.
Brazil’s Mauro Vieira characterised this as “the main issue” but also “the richness” of BRICS — a diplomatically careful framing that avoids taking sides while acknowledging the depth of the rupture. Brazil itself has been strongly critical of Israeli attacks on civilian populations in Gaza, noting the deaths of Brazilian citizens including children. This positions Brazil closer to the Iranian-Palestinian axis on the West Asia issue, though still short of direct confrontation with the US.
India’s position is particularly delicate. As BRICS chair and host of the September Summit, India must manage a grouping where two members are effectively at war with each other. India’s own strategic interests — its energy dependence on Gulf states, its strategic partnership with the US, its cautious engagement with Iran (particularly regarding the Chabahar Port), and its commitment to “strategic autonomy” — mean it cannot align completely with any side without diplomatic costs.
India’s Strategic Interests and BRICS Diplomacy
India has historically used BRICS as one platform for its “multi-alignment” foreign policy — engaging simultaneously with Russia, China, the US, and the West on India’s own terms. The BRICS platform has been particularly useful for India’s advocacy of UN Security Council reform, IMF quota rebalancing, and greater voice for developing countries in global governance.
Under India’s Presidency, the New Delhi BRICS Summit in September 2026 carries enormous significance. India wishes to demonstrate that it can manage multilateral diplomacy at the highest level, bridge the Iran-UAE divide, produce a substantive joint declaration on Palestinian statehood (a two-state solution), and advance India-specific priorities around digital economy, climate finance, and supply chain resilience. The inclusion of Gaza and Israel-Palestine in BRICS discussions is a diplomatic tightrope — India does not want to appear to endorse either party in the conflict while expressing support for Palestinian rights, as it did at the G20 under its presidency.
De-dollarisation: Separating Reality from Rhetoric
One of BRICS’s most discussed (and internationally contentious) themes is de-dollarisation. Donald Trump has threatened BRICS members with 100% tariffs if they proceed with creating an alternative currency or payment system to replace the US dollar. Brazil’s Mauro Vieira carefully clarified: “President Lula never spoke of de-dollarisation or the creation of a BRICS currency. He only spoke about mechanisms of payments in local currencies.”
This distinction is important. The concept of bilateral trade in local currencies — which India has been actively pursuing, including with Russia in the context of oil trade — is legally and institutionally very different from creating a BRICS currency or an alternative to SWIFT. Many BRICS members, including India, have been cautious about being portrayed as seeking to replace the dollar, preferring the language of “alternative payment mechanisms” and “reducing dollar dependence” rather than outright de-dollarisation.
The New Development Bank (NDB) has been slow to fulfil its de-dollarisation promise — most of its lending still occurs in dollars because borrowing countries need dollars for international trade payments. This structural reality limits how quickly BRICS can operationalise any alternative financial architecture.
Bihar Connection
Bihar’s connection to BRICS and West Asia geopolitics manifests primarily through the labour migration channel. Bihar is among the top states sending workers to West Asia, and the BRICS-affiliated Gulf countries — particularly the UAE (now a BRICS member) — host millions of Indian workers, many from Bihar. The West Asia conflict and the Iran-UAE confrontation within BRICS directly affect the livelihoods of Bihari migrant workers. Moreover, Bihar’s aspiration to attract New Development Bank (NDB) financing for infrastructure projects — roads, railways, irrigation, smart cities — is directly linked to BRICS’s institutional health and NDB’s lending capacity.
Way Forward
India should use its BRICS Presidency to convene a special West Asia dialogue track within BRICS — perhaps a sub-group of foreign policy advisors — to quietly build bridges between Iran and UAE, using India’s traditional Non-Aligned positioning and its relationship with both countries. The New Development Bank should be urged to increase the share of lending in non-dollar currencies, particularly Indian rupees, Chinese yuan, and Brazilian reais, to give tangible meaning to the de-dollarisation aspiration. India should anchor the September Summit around specific deliverables — a reformed NDB governance structure, a BRICS Climate Finance Framework, and a Digital Economy Cooperation Agreement — rather than allowing it to be dominated by the West Asia debate.
Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations
UPSC Papers: GS-II (International Relations — Multilateral Institutions, India’s Foreign Policy, India and its Neighbourhood, West Asia), Essay (Multilateralism in the 21st Century)
SSC Topics: General Awareness — International Organisations, India’s Foreign Relations
Key Terms: BRICS, New Development Bank (NDB), Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), Johannesburg Expansion, Chair Statement vs. Joint Statement, De-dollarisation, Multi-alignment, Chabahar Port, BRICS+ format, Two-State Solution, Operation Sindoor