The resignation of Allahabad High Court judge Yashwant Varma, submitted to President Droupadi Murmu on April 9, 2026, brings to a close one of the most extraordinary chapters in the recent history of Indian judiciary. The judge’s resignation came after a three-judge inquiry committee found prima facie evidence that cash had been recovered from a storeroom at his official Delhi residence during a fire in March 2025, and after the Supreme Court Collegium had already recommended his removal under Article 124(4) of the Constitution. The resignation forestalled the conclusion of a Lok Sabha-constituted inquiry committee, raising questions about whether the in-house mechanism of the judiciary is adequate for accountability.
This episode has reignited a debate that periodically surfaces in Indian public discourse: can the judiciary, entrusted with the responsibility of holding other institutions accountable, hold itself accountable? The opacity surrounding judicial misconduct complaints, the rarity of impeachment proceedings, and the limitations of the Right to Information Act in the context of the judiciary all converge in this case. For UPSC aspirants, this is a rich topic that intersects constitutional law, institutional design, democratic accountability, and rule of law.
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The Union Law Minister’s disclosure in February 2026 that 8,630 complaints against sitting judges were received between 2016 and 2025 — a rise of over 51 percent — adds a statistical dimension to what might otherwise appear to be an isolated incident. The fact that disclosures about the handling of these complaints remain incomplete, and that RTI requests seeking details were denied by the Supreme Court Registry, exposes the structural deficit in judicial transparency.
Background: The Constitutional Framework for Judicial Accountability
Five Important Key Points
- Article 124(4) of the Constitution provides that a Supreme Court judge can be removed only by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of total membership and a two-thirds majority of members present and voting — an extremely high procedural threshold that has never been successfully crossed since Independence.
- The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 establishes the procedure for investigation of misbehaviour or incapacity of a Supreme Court or High Court judge, requiring the formation of a three-member inquiry committee comprising a former Chief Justice, a sitting Supreme Court judge, and a distinguished jurist.
- The in-house procedure of the Supreme Court, adopted in 1999, provides a non-statutory mechanism for the Chief Justice of India to investigate complaints against judges without resorting to the formal parliamentary impeachment process.
- The Centralized Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System (CPGRAMS) routes complaints against judges to the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justices of respective High Courts, but there is no publicly accessible tracking mechanism to monitor the disposal of such complaints.
- The Supreme Court Registry’s denial of RTI requests concerning the 8,630 complaints, citing disproportionate diversion of resources and Section 8 exemptions, illustrates the judiciary’s resistance to transparency even in aggregate, non-personal data.
The Impeachment Mechanism and Its Limitations
The constitutional mechanism for judicial removal through impeachment has proved to be almost entirely non-functional as a practical accountability tool. Since Independence, no judge has ever been successfully impeached. The closest the process came to completion was the case of Justice V. Ramaswami in 1993, when a motion supported by the required majority in the Lok Sabha was defeated only because the Congress party abstained from voting — a striking demonstration of how political calculations can override institutional necessity.
The impeachment threshold — requiring support from more than 100 Lok Sabha members or more than 50 Rajya Sabha members to initiate proceedings, followed by the two-thirds majority requirement — effectively makes impeachment contingent on political will. In a politically fragmented legislature, building such a consensus is extremely difficult, particularly when the ruling party may have its own reasons for not pursuing judicial accountability aggressively. As Prashant Bhushan noted, this architecture makes impeachment “contingent on political will rather than the merits of the complaint.”
The Varma case illustrates this dependence. After the Collegium recommended removal proceedings and a Lok Sabha committee was constituted, Justice Varma resigned before the inquiry could be completed. While this achieved the practical outcome of his departure from the judiciary, it also meant that a formal finding of guilt was never recorded, the full details of the inquiry remain partly confidential, and the precedential value of the proceedings is limited.
The In-House Procedure: Strength and Shortcomings
The in-house procedure adopted by the Supreme Court in 1999 was designed as a discretionary, administrative mechanism to handle complaints without the disruption and publicity of impeachment proceedings. Under this procedure, complaints are forwarded to the Chief Justice of India, who may constitute a committee to inquire into the matter. If the committee finds substance in the complaint, it can recommend administrative action — including divestiture of judicial work and repatriation to the parent High Court — or initiate formal removal proceedings.
In the Varma case, the in-house procedure worked in the sense that the Collegium took cognisance, repatriated the judge to the Allahabad High Court, divested him of judicial work, and recommended impeachment. However, the limitations are equally evident. The proceedings are entirely opaque — the three-judge committee’s report was not made public. There is no mechanism for the complainant or the public to receive updates on the status of inquiry. Former Chief Justice S. Muralidhar correctly observed that “there is no justification for withholding data on the number of complaints and their status.”
Transparency, RTI, and the Accountability Deficit
The Right to Information Act, 2005 applies to all public authorities, including constitutional courts. However, the judiciary has historically taken a restrictive view of RTI applicability to its administrative functions, invoking exemptions under Section 8 and arguing that judicial independence requires protection from public scrutiny of administrative processes. The Supreme Court’s own judgment in Subhash Chandra Agarwal v. Supreme Court of India (2019) held that the Chief Justice’s office is a public authority under RTI.
Yet, the practical experience documented in the Varma case shows that even aggregate statistical information about complaints is being withheld. The Supreme Court Registry’s response that “necessary action was taken” without providing details was described by RTI activist Saurav Das as “paternalistic.” The Central Information Commission is now the next recourse. This situation reflects a deeper tension: the judiciary’s legitimate concern for its independence and the dignity of sitting judges must be balanced against the public’s right to know that an accountable system exists for handling misconduct.
The NCERT Textbook Contempt and Free Speech Concerns
A related dimension of the accountability debate is the Supreme Court’s suo motu cognisance of an NCERT Class 8 textbook that referenced corruption in the judiciary, leading to its withdrawal and the dissociation of those involved in its preparation. The Court’s characterisation of the references as constituting “prima facie criminal contempt” and as reflecting a “discernible underlying agenda” raises serious questions about the boundaries of permissible criticism of constitutional courts.
Former Supreme Court judge Abhay S. Oka’s observation — echoing Lord Denning — that contempt powers should not be invoked to uphold the court’s dignity but must rest on surer foundations, provides an important corrective framework. The judiciary’s credibility ultimately rests on the quality of its judgments and the integrity of its processes, not on the suppression of critical commentary.
Way Forward
A comprehensive judicial accountability framework requires legislative and institutional reform. Parliament should enact a Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill — an earlier version of which lapsed in 2014 — that establishes a statutory National Judicial Oversight Committee with representatives from the judiciary, executive, and civil society, empowered to receive, investigate, and act on complaints against judges. Inquiry reports should be made public after the conclusion of proceedings, with appropriate redactions to protect personal information. The appointment process through the Collegium system should incorporate greater transparency, with published reasons for appointments and elevations. Finally, the RTI Act should be explicitly applied to the administrative functions of the Supreme Court and High Courts, with a dedicated public information infrastructure to handle complaints and track their disposal.
Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations
This topic falls under GS Paper II, specifically Judiciary — appointment, removal, accountability, and independence. It also relates to the Right to Information Act, Constitutional Articles 124 and 217 governing judicial removal, and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. For GS Paper IV, it raises issues of integrity and institutional ethics. Essay topics on “Accountability of Constitutional Institutions” or “Rule of Law” would benefit from this analysis. For SSC, it covers Indian Polity topics on High Courts, Supreme Court, and fundamental rights. Key terms: Article 124(4), Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968, In-house procedure, Collegium system, RTI and Judiciary, contempt of court.