On March 11, 2026, the Lok Sabha took up a no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against Speaker Om Birla, marking only the fourth such attempt in independent India’s parliamentary history. The motion was initiated by Congress MPs K. Suresh, Mohammad Jawed, and Mallu Ravi, with Deputy Leader Gaurav Gogoi leading the debate. Parliamentary Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju described the resolution as an “attack on democracy itself,” while the Opposition argued it was necessary to “save the Constitution” and protect the neutrality of the presiding officer. Ten hours were allocated for the debate, with Union Home Minister Amit Shah expected to intervene before the House voted.
This episode is not merely a political confrontation. It goes to the heart of India’s parliamentary democracy: the office of the Speaker, constitutionally mandated to be an impartial arbiter of legislative proceedings, has increasingly become a site of contestation. Specific grievances raised by the Opposition include the mass suspension of 100 MPs in December 2023 — the single largest suspension in Lok Sabha history — the alleged selective switching off of microphones, the refusal to allow the Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi to speak without interruption, expungement of Opposition remarks while Treasury bench allegations remained on record, and the unprecedented twelve-year vacancy in the office of the Deputy Speaker. Each of these grievances, taken individually, is a procedural matter. Taken collectively, they represent a systemic concern about the erosion of parliamentary conventions.
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UPSC aspirants must engage with this issue at multiple levels: the constitutional framework governing the Speaker’s tenure and removal, the historical precedents of such motions, the institutional conventions that define parliamentary impartiality, and the broader question of whether India’s legislature requires structural reforms to restore public trust in its functioning.
Table of Contents
Background and Context
Five Important Key Points
- The office of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha is created under Article 93 of the Constitution of India, which mandates that the House shall, as soon as may be, choose two members to be the Speaker and Deputy Speaker respectively.
- Article 94(c) provides that the Speaker may be removed from office by a resolution of the Lok Sabha passed by a majority of all the then members of the House, requiring fourteen days’ prior written notice before such a motion is taken up.
- Only three no-confidence motions against a Speaker have previously been moved in India’s parliamentary history — against G.V. Mavalankar in 1954, Hukam Singh in 1966, and Balram Jakhar in 1987 — and all three failed.
- The procedural framework for removal of the Speaker is governed by Rules 200 to 203 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, which mandate that the resolution must clearly state specific charges against the Speaker.
- The post of Deputy Speaker, constitutionally required under Article 93, has remained vacant since 2014 — a period spanning twelve years — which is itself a violation of constitutional convention, as Congress MP K.C. Venugopal argued creates a “constitutional vacuum.”
Constitutional Framework Governing the Speaker’s Office
The Speaker’s office derives its authority from a cluster of constitutional provisions. Article 93 mandates the election of both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker. Article 94 governs vacation of their offices. Article 96 prohibits the Speaker from presiding when a resolution for removal is being considered, though the Speaker may speak and vote as a member. Article 105 protects parliamentary freedom of speech, while Article 118 empowers the House to make its own rules of procedure.
The high threshold for removal — a majority of all then members, not merely those present and voting — reflects the constitution-makers’ intent to insulate the Speaker from routine political pressure. This threshold distinguishes the Speaker’s removal from an ordinary vote of no-confidence against the government, which requires only a simple majority of members present and voting under Article 75.
However, the same constitutional insulation that protects the Speaker from partisan pressure can also function as a shield against legitimate accountability. The no-confidence motion, even when politically unlikely to succeed, serves a vital constitutional purpose: it operationalises democratic accountability within the legislature itself.
Historical and Legislative Background
The institution of the Speaker in India is modelled on the Westminster system, where the Speaker is expected to resign from their party upon election and conduct themselves with strict impartiality thereafter. India’s first Speaker, G.V. Mavalankar, helped establish many of the conventions that governed the office for decades. His successors, including Hukam Singh, Bali Ram Bhagat, and Shivraj Patil, broadly maintained the tradition of bipartisan functioning.
The no-confidence motion of 1987 against Balram Jakhar is particularly instructive. It arose during a period of severe political turbulence following the Bofors controversy, yet it failed comprehensively. The lesson drawn from that precedent was that the institution of the Speaker was robust enough to withstand even serious political allegations. However, that robustness depended critically on the perception of neutrality — a perception that critics argue has been progressively eroded in recent years.
Specific Grievances and Their Institutional Significance
The Opposition’s specific grievances are worth examining carefully because they reveal structural rather than merely personal failures. The mass suspension of 100 MPs in December 2023 was without precedent. Trinamool Congress MP Mahua Moitra noted that since 2004, a total of 245 MPs have been suspended from the Lok Sabha, all from Opposition parties, with 120 suspensions occurring during Speaker Birla’s tenure alone. Nearly half of all Lok Sabha suspensions since 2004 occurred in a single episode.
The microphone controversy is equally significant. Samajwadi Party MP Rajeev Rai alleged that microphones are never cut when treasury bench members attack former Prime Ministers, but are switched off within thirty seconds when Opposition members question the government. This allegation strikes at the foundational premise that the Speaker controls proceedings impartially.
The Deputy Speaker vacancy issue deserves particular attention. Under Article 93, the election of a Deputy Speaker is mandatory, not optional. The twelve-year vacancy means that in the Speaker’s absence, the House is presided over by members of the panel of chairpersons — a panel appointed by the Speaker — which inherently creates an appearance of partiality. AIMIM MP Asaduddin Owaisi raised precisely this point during the proceedings when objecting to BJP MP Jagdambika Pal chairing the session.
Anti-Defection Law and Certification of Money Bills
Two of the most consequential powers vested in the Speaker — the decision to disqualify legislators under the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law) and the certification of Money Bills under Article 110 — have been flashpoints in recent years. Supreme Court judgments, including Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020), have held that the Speaker cannot indefinitely delay disqualification petitions. The certification of the Finance Bill as a Money Bill has also attracted judicial scrutiny, with the Supreme Court in Rojer Mathew vs South Indian Bank Ltd (2019) referring the issue to a larger Constitution Bench. Both controversies underscore that when the Speaker’s impartiality is questioned, the institutional damage extends well beyond Parliament.
Governance Concerns and Institutional Challenges
Three structural challenges affect the functioning of the Speaker’s office. First, there is a growing politicisation of procedural decisions. Decisions on disqualification petitions, Money Bill certifications, and the admission or rejection of Calling Attention motions are increasingly perceived through partisan lenses, irrespective of their merits. Second, the erosion of unwritten parliamentary conventions — the norms that once guided the impartial conduct of the Speaker — has accelerated as political competition intensifies. Third, the absence of a statutory framework codifying the Speaker’s discretionary powers creates ambiguities that all parties exploit.
Way Forward
To restore credibility to the institution of the Speaker, several structural reforms are necessary. First, the election of the Deputy Speaker must be made obligatory through a constitutional amendment that prescribes a time limit. Second, the anti-defection law must be amended to transfer adjudication of disqualification petitions from the Speaker to an independent tribunal, as recommended by multiple Law Commission reports including the 255th Report. Third, the certification of Money Bills should be made judicially reviewable by expanding the scope of the Supreme Court’s powers under Article 143. Fourth, political parties should collectively commit to the convention of bipartisan support for the Speaker’s election and respect for the neutrality of the Chair once elected. Fifth, the Rules of Procedure should be codified to provide clear guidelines for the exercise of the Speaker’s discretionary powers, particularly regarding the suspension of members and the expungement of remarks.
Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations
UPSC: GS Paper II — Indian Polity (Parliament and State Legislatures, Constitutional Posts, Anti-Defection Law, Money Bills, Parliamentary Conventions). Essay Paper — Democratic institutions and their integrity.
SSC: General Awareness — Indian Polity, Parliament, Constitutional Articles.
Key Terms: Article 93, Article 94(c), Article 96, Article 110, Tenth Schedule, Rules 200-203 of Lok Sabha Procedure, Anti-Defection Law, Deputy Speaker, Westminster Model, Keisham Meghachandra Singh case, 255th Law Commission Report.