The Supreme Court of India is set to hear final arguments in the review petitions challenging the landmark 2018 Sabarimala judgment, which had permitted women of all ages to enter the Sabarimala temple in Kerala. The 2018 decision, delivered by a five-judge bench with a 4:1 majority, had opened the doors of the temple to women between the ages of 10 and 50, who had previously been excluded on religious grounds. The review petitions, which challenge this judgment, are now before a nine-judge Constitutional Bench — a composition that signals the court’s recognition that the case raises fundamental questions about the architecture of India’s religious freedom jurisprudence.
This case is significant not merely for its immediate outcome on temple entry for women, but for the broader doctrinal question it poses: What standard should courts use when evaluating whether a religious practice that excludes individuals — on grounds of gender, caste, or other identity characteristics — is constitutionally permissible? The court’s answer will shape the landscape of religious freedom, equality, and anti-discrimination law in India for decades.
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For UPSC aspirants, this topic directly engages GS-II themes of fundamental rights, judiciary, religious freedom, and gender justice, while also offering rich material for the Ethics paper and the Essay.
Table of Contents
Background and the 2018 Judgment
Five Important Key Points
- The 2018 Supreme Court judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Association vs State of Kerala ruled 4:1 in favour of allowing women of all ages to enter Sabarimala, with the majority finding that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa did not constitute a separate religious denomination protected by Article 26.
- The lone dissent by Justice Indu Malhotra held that the exclusion of women of a certain age constituted an “essential religious practice” entitled to constitutional protection, and that the court should not impose a generic doctrine of equality over the collective rights of religious communities to practise their faith in accordance with their customs.
- Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which formed the legal basis for the exclusion of women, was struck down by the majority as violating both the parent statute’s mandate of free access for all classes of Hindus and the Constitution’s fundamental rights provisions.
- Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, in his concurring opinion, proposed an “anti-exclusion test” as an alternative to the much-criticised “essential religious practices test”, arguing that religious autonomy must yield when its exercise systematically excludes individuals from spaces and benefits that are integral to their ability to lead a life of dignity.
- The nine-judge bench now hearing the review petitions has the potential to recalibrate the entire framework of religious freedom jurisprudence in India, with implications beyond Sabarimala for cases involving Dawoodi Bohra excommunication, Parsi women’s religious rights, and Scheduled Caste temple entry rights.
Historical Background of the Essential Religious Practices Test
The “essential religious practices” test has been the primary judicial instrument for adjudicating conflicts between religious freedom and other fundamental rights since the early decades of the Republic. The test holds that the Constitution protects only those religious practices that are essential or integral to the religion, and that practices which are not essential are not entitled to constitutional protection.
The test originated in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt case of 1954, and was elaborated in subsequent decisions. In Sastri Yagnapurushadji vs Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya (1966), Chief Justice Gajendragadkar made factual determinations about what was essential to the Swaminarayan sect based on selective readings of Hindu texts — without examining what the actual conscience of the followers dictated, and without oral evidence or cross-examination of any theological experts.
This judicial tendency to determine theological questions from the bench — effectively sitting as a religious arbiter — has attracted sustained academic and judicial criticism. The court lacks the institutional competence to make theological determinations, and the test allows judges to substitute their own reading of religious texts for the lived practice of religious communities.
Constitutional Framework: Articles 25, 26, 14, and 15
The constitutional provisions at the heart of this case form a carefully balanced framework. Article 25 guarantees all persons the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, and health, and to other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion, subject to the same restrictions.
Articles 14 and 15 guarantee equality before the law and non-discrimination on grounds of sex, religion, caste, race, or place of birth. The interplay between the freedom of religion (Articles 25 and 26) and the equality rights (Articles 14 and 15) lies at the core of the Sabarimala dispute — the majority held that the right to equality overrides a non-essential religious practice, while the dissent held that religious autonomy is itself a form of equality.
Additionally, Article 17 of the Constitution abolishes untouchability in any form, and the Supreme Court has read this provision together with Article 25(2)(b), which explicitly permits the state to enact laws providing for the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. This provision directly authorises the kind of intervention the Kerala government’s 1965 rules were meant to effect.
The Anti-Exclusion Test: An Alternative Framework
Justice Chandrachud’s anti-exclusion test offers a potentially more principled alternative to the essential religious practices test. The test accepts, as a starting point, the autonomy of religious groups to define their own tenets and practices — thus respecting religious freedom. It intervenes only when the exercise of that autonomy systematically excludes individuals from places or benefits that are integral to their ability to lead a life of dignity.
The test’s key virtue is that it grounds constitutional inquiry in constitutional terms rather than theological ones. Instead of asking whether a practice is essential to a religion — which requires courts to make theological judgments — it asks whether the consequences of a practice are compatible with the Constitution’s guarantees of equal treatment and the right to dignity under Article 21.
The test does, however, have its own complications. Determining whether a practice impairs dignity or hampers access to basic goods requires courts to engage with the purpose and meaning of the practice — an inquiry that cannot be conducted entirely in a theological vacuum. But the critical difference is that the investigation remains anchored in constitutional concepts of dignity and equality rather than in theological categories of essentiality.
Social and Gender Justice Dimensions
The Sabarimala case is, at its core, a case about the constitutional status of women’s right to access religious spaces without being subject to discrimination based on biological characteristics. The exclusion of women of menstruating age from the temple is premised on notions of ritual purity and pollution that have historically been used to subordinate women across many religious and cultural traditions.
Menstrual taboos continue to restrict women’s participation in religious, social, and public life across India. Judicial validation of such exclusions, even under the rubric of religious freedom, sends a signal that the Constitution tolerates biological discrimination when it is cloaked in religious language. This has implications not just for temple entry but for women’s access to places of worship across religious traditions.
Way Forward
The nine-judge bench should use this opportunity to formally replace the essential religious practices test with the anti-exclusion test or a similarly constitutionally grounded standard. The court should also clarify that the right of religious communities to manage their own affairs under Article 26 does not extend to practices that violate the fundamental dignity of individuals as guaranteed by Article 21, read with Articles 14 and 15. Parliament should consider comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation — long recommended by the Law Commission — that addresses exclusion from public and quasi-public spaces on grounds of gender, caste, disability, and other protected characteristics.
Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations
This topic is directly relevant for UPSC GS-II under constitutional provisions, functioning of the judiciary, fundamental rights, and women’s empowerment. It is also critical for the Ethics paper under themes of discrimination, dignity, and the interface of personal belief with public institutional obligations. For SSC examinations, it covers constitutional provisions and important Supreme Court judgments.
Key terms: Essential Religious Practices test, Anti-Exclusion test, Article 25, Article 26, Article 21, Sabarimala judgment 2018, Kesavananda Bharati, Indian Young Lawyers Association case, Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Rules 1965.