The Union Home Ministry on February 23, 2026, released India’s first-ever comprehensive anti-terrorism policy titled PRAHAAR — the National Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategy. This landmark development marks a decisive institutional shift in how India conceptualises, coordinates, and responds to the multifaceted terror threats it faces domestically and from across its borders. The policy, which had been first reported by The Hindu on December 23, 2025, as being in the finalisation stage, comes in the backdrop of the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam terror attack and a series of cross-border drone-facilitated infiltration attempts in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.
The timing of this policy release is deeply significant. India has long operated without a unified, codified counter-terrorism framework. While institutional mechanisms like the National Investigation Agency (NIA), National Security Guard (NSG), and state Anti-Terror Squads (ATS) have existed, the absence of a single governing policy document meant that coordination between central and state agencies was ad hoc, procedurally inconsistent, and vulnerable to jurisdictional friction. PRAHAAR attempts to address this structural lacuna comprehensively.
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The policy’s release also arrives in a broader geopolitical context where India simultaneously faces threats from Jihadi terror outfits operating from Pakistani soil, the expanding digital capabilities of terrorist groups, the misuse of drone technology, and the growing nexus between organised crime and terror logistics.
Table of Contents
What is PRAHAAR and What Does It Contain
Five Important Key Points
- PRAHAAR is India’s first formally codified national counter-terrorism policy and has been uploaded on the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) website for public access.
- The policy recognises three-dimensional threats — on water, land, and air — and calls for the protection of critical infrastructure sectors including power, railways, aviation, ports, defence, space, and atomic energy.
- It explicitly states that India does not link terrorism to any specific religion, ethnicity, nationality, or civilisation, yet acknowledges the impact of “sponsored terrorism” from across the border involving Jihadi terror outfits.
- The policy identifies the role of global terror groups such as al-Qaeda and IS in attempting to incite violence within India through sleeper cells.
- It proposes a uniform anti-terrorism structure across all states to standardise processes and ensure synergistic responses to terror attacks.
PRAHAAR is a nine-page document, yet its significance far exceeds its volume. The policy lays out a comprehensive threat profile, institutional response framework, and a strategic roadmap that integrates legal, intelligence, technological, and community dimensions of counter-terrorism. It identifies not just physical threats but also digital ones, recognising that criminal hackers and nation-states continue to target India through cyber-attacks.
One of the most significant features of the policy is its explicit acknowledgement of CBRNED threats — Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive, and Digital. This represents a formal expansion of India’s counter-terrorism vocabulary beyond conventional explosives-based attacks. Disrupting terrorist access to CBRNED materials is identified as one of the core ongoing challenges for counter-terrorism agencies.
The policy also emphasises the role of the dark web, encrypted messaging platforms, crypto wallets, and drone technology in facilitating terror activities. This is a forward-looking acknowledgement that terror operations in the 21st century are deeply embedded in digital infrastructure, and that counter-terrorism responses must evolve accordingly.
Institutional Architecture and Legal Dimensions
From a governance perspective, PRAHAAR is significant because it proposes the establishment of a uniform anti-terrorism structure across all states. Currently, counter-terrorism operations in India involve a complex network of institutions — the NIA at the central level, state ATS units, the Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analysis Wing, Central Armed Police Forces, and various specialised units. The lack of standardisation across state-level structures has historically created gaps in intelligence sharing, evidence collection, and prosecution.
The policy underlines the importance of associating legal experts at every stage of counter-terrorism investigations to build stronger cases. This is a critical observation given that many high-profile terror cases in India have seen acquittals or prolonged trials due to procedural errors, inadmissible evidence, or inadequate charge-sheet preparation. The focus on legal robustness is an acknowledgement that security operations alone are insufficient without corresponding judicial outcomes.
India’s counter-terrorism legal framework rests on the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967 as amended most recently in 2019, the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, and various state-level laws. PRAHAAR does not replace these legal instruments but provides a strategic framework within which these laws are to be operationalised more effectively.
The policy also emphasises international and regional cooperation as key elements in addressing transnational terrorism, given that terrorist groups increasingly rely on cross-border logistic networks. This connects India’s domestic counter-terrorism architecture to its broader foreign policy posture, including its engagement with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and bilateral agreements with various countries on counter-terrorism cooperation.
Drone Threat and Cross-Border Dimensions
Perhaps the most contemporary element of PRAHAAR is its recognition of drone technology as an emerging terror delivery mechanism. The policy explicitly notes that handlers from across the border frequently use drones to facilitate terror-related activities and attacks in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir. This acknowledgement is backed by substantial on-ground evidence — multiple incidents of drug drops, weapons transfers, and IED deliveries via unmanned aerial vehicles have been documented in Punjab in particular.
The policy’s recognition of the organised crime-terror nexus is equally important. Terrorist groups are described as engaging criminal networks for logistics and recruitment, which has been a visible pattern in the Punjab-Pakistan corridor where drug trafficking networks have been co-opted for terror support. This nexus demands an integrated law enforcement response that combines counter-narcotics operations with counter-terrorism efforts.
The policy further recognises the use of social media platforms and instant messaging applications for propaganda, communication, and coordination of attacks. The regulation and monitoring of these platforms has been a longstanding governance challenge given the tension between surveillance powers and civil liberties, and PRAHAAR frames this as a strategic priority rather than merely a law enforcement concern.
Community Engagement and Deradicalisation
One of the more nuanced aspects of PRAHAAR is its emphasis on community and religious leaders as partners in preventing radicalisation. The policy calls for engaging moderate preachers and civil society organisations to spread awareness about the consequences of extremism. This approach reflects a growing international consensus — evidenced in the United Kingdom’s PREVENT programme, Germany’s deradicalisation initiatives, and similar frameworks — that counter-terrorism cannot rely solely on security operations but must include community-based prevention.
Indian intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been described in the policy as continuously working to prevent the recruitment of Indian youth by extremist groups, particularly those operating from abroad. The challenge here is significant: online radicalisation through social media algorithms and targeted content has made geographic boundaries increasingly irrelevant in the spread of extremist ideology.
The policy’s statement that India does not link terrorism to any specific religion is both a constitutional affirmation and a strategic communication choice. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before law, and Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Any counter-terrorism framework that operationally profiles communities on religious lines would be constitutionally vulnerable and strategically counterproductive by alienating the very communities whose cooperation is essential for intelligence gathering.
Challenges in Implementation
Despite its comprehensive articulation, PRAHAAR faces significant implementation challenges. India’s federal structure means that law and order, including counter-terrorism, involves a shared responsibility between the Centre and states. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution places Public Order in the State List (Entry 1) and Police in the State List (Entry 2). The Centre’s ability to impose uniform structures on state counter-terrorism apparatuses is therefore legally constrained and requires cooperative federalism rather than top-down mandates.
Furthermore, the policy’s ambitions around digital counter-terrorism require massive investments in technical capacity, a trained cybersecurity workforce, and inter-agency data sharing protocols that are currently underdeveloped. The proposed standardisation of counter-terrorism processes across states will require sustained funding, training programmes, and institutional reform at the state level, none of which can be achieved through a policy document alone.
The nexus between organised crime and terrorism also demands regulatory and enforcement reforms beyond the home ministry — including in financial regulation, border management, and foreign policy coordination.
Way Forward
PRAHAAR represents a necessary and overdue step in India’s counter-terrorism governance architecture. Its value lies not just in what it codifies but in providing a shared vocabulary and strategic framework within which India’s diverse security institutions can align their operations. The next steps must include operational guidelines, resource allocations, inter-agency protocols, and most importantly, legislative backing for the new institutional arrangements it proposes.
The policy must be followed by a comprehensive review and possible consolidation of India’s counter-terrorism legal framework, bridging the UAPA with state-level laws and ensuring that the entire criminal justice chain — from investigation to prosecution to conviction — is capable of delivering timely and constitutionally sound outcomes.
Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations
For UPSC Mains, this topic is directly relevant to General Studies Paper 3 (Internal Security, Challenges to Internal Security, Role of External State and Non-State Actors, Cybersecurity, Money Laundering) and General Studies Paper 2 (Government Policies and Interventions, Federalism). Essay Paper topics on national security, the evolving nature of terrorism, and India’s strategic responses are directly connected to this development.
For SSC examinations, particularly SSC CGL, this is relevant to General Awareness sections covering important government policies, MHA initiatives, and internal security frameworks. Questions on NIA, UAPA, drone regulation, and India’s counter-terrorism architecture have appeared in previous SSC examinations and are likely to recur given the current salience of this topic.
The introduction of PRAHAAR also provides an excellent case study for candidates preparing for the essay on India’s internal security challenges, connecting constitutional provisions, institutional design, federalism, technology governance, and community engagement within a single analytical framework.