Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s address to the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, on February 26, 2026, marked only the second visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel — the first being his own visit in 2017. The address was notable for its unambiguous condemnation of the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, as a “barbaric terrorist attack”, its expression of strong bilateral solidarity, and its support for the Gaza Peace Initiative endorsed by the UN Security Council. These positions collectively signal a significant crystallisation of India’s stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict — one that departs from the more carefully balanced posture India had historically maintained.
The visit acquires additional significance because it comes barely weeks after India aligned with over 100 countries at the United Nations in criticising Israel’s moves in the West Bank, including signing a joint statement on settlement expansion after initially abstaining. This apparent contradiction — voting to criticise Israel at the UN while the Prime Minister addresses the Knesset in terms of solidarity — reflects the complexity of India’s multi-vector foreign policy and its attempt to maintain simultaneously productive relationships with Israel, Gulf Arab states, Palestine, and the broader international community.
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For UPSC aspirants, this topic provides an ideal case study in the evolution of India’s foreign policy from strategic autonomy to a more proactive but carefully calibrated engagement, particularly in conflict zones where major power interests and energy security converge.
Table of Contents
Background and Historical Context of India-Israel Relations
Five Important Key Points
- India and Israel established full diplomatic relations only in 1992, decades after Israel’s establishment in 1948, largely because India’s Cold War era Non-Aligned Movement commitments and its large Muslim-majority population made open engagement with Israel politically sensitive.
- Bilateral trade peaked at over 10.7 billion US dollars in 2022-23, before declining to 3.6 billion dollars in 2024-25 due to war-related disruptions and difficulties in trade routes, demonstrating how geopolitical instability directly impacts economic relationships.
- India has emerged as one of the largest importers of Israeli arms, accounting for over 38 percent of Israel’s arms exports between 2014 and 2024 according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data, making defence cooperation the cornerstone of the bilateral strategic partnership.
- Diamonds occupy a unique position in bilateral trade, with India importing rough diamonds from Israel, processing them domestically, and re-exporting finished products, creating a symbiotic value chain that accounts for approximately one-third of India’s imports from Israel and about 22 percent of exports.
- As of October 2024, approximately 32,000 Indian workers were employed in Israel — many recruited after the Gaza conflict to replace Palestinian labour in the construction sector — creating a significant human mobility dimension to the bilateral relationship.
India’s Historical Position on the Israel-Palestine Conflict
India was among the first countries to recognise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974, and it recognised the State of Palestine in 1988. For decades, India’s UN voting record consistently supported Palestinian statehood, condemnation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and the principle of a two-state solution based on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.
The transformation began with the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, during the tenure of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, a decision that was politically facilitated by the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO. Subsequently, India pursued what foreign policy scholars described as a “de-hyphenation” strategy — engaging Israel bilaterally on defence, agriculture, and technology while maintaining rhetorical support for Palestinian rights at multilateral forums. This approach allowed India to benefit from Israeli defence technology, intelligence cooperation, and agricultural expertise without fundamentally altering its declared position on Palestinian statehood.
Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel — the first by any Indian Prime Minister — broke the long-standing practice of Indian Prime Ministers visiting Palestine in the same trip as Israel, effectively validating the de-hyphenation approach at the highest level of diplomatic signalling.
Geopolitical Dimensions: India’s Multi-Vector West Asia Strategy
India’s West Asia policy must be understood through multiple simultaneous interests that occasionally conflict with each other. Gulf Cooperation Council countries — Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain — host approximately 9 million Indian diaspora workers who remit over 40 billion dollars annually to India. India imports approximately 60 percent of its crude oil requirements from the Gulf region. Any significant deterioration of India’s relationship with Arab states would have immediate and severe economic consequences.
Simultaneously, Israel offers India access to defence technologies, cyber security capabilities, agricultural irrigation technology, and intelligence cooperation that few other bilateral relationships can match. The Abraham Accords of 2020, which normalised relations between Israel and several Arab states including the UAE and Bahrain, paradoxically made it somewhat easier for India to deepen its Israel relationship without it being perceived as anti-Arab.
Modi’s Knesset address explicitly referenced the Abraham Accords as showing “courage and vision”, and expressed regret that the momentum had been disrupted by the post-October 2023 situation. This positioning aligns India with the bloc of countries that see Arab-Israeli normalisation as a pathway to regional stability — a significant foreign policy alignment that has implications for India’s relationships with Iran, Turkey, and the broader Muslim world.
Defence and Technology Cooperation: Strategic Significance
India-Israel defence cooperation spans decades of joint development, co-production, and licensed manufacture of military equipment. Key systems include the Barak air defence missile system used by the Indian Navy, the Heron and Searcher unmanned aerial vehicle series used by the Indian Army, the Spyder quick-reaction surface-to-air missile system, and various small arms and ammunition systems.
Beyond hardware, Israel’s Unit 8200 — the equivalent of the NSA or GCHQ — has been India’s partner in cyber security and signals intelligence capacity building. In the context of India’s security concerns relating to cross-border terrorism and hybrid warfare from Pakistan-based groups, this intelligence relationship has operational value that transcends formal diplomatic frameworks.
The visit’s emphasis on “cross-border financial linkages using Digital Public Infrastructure” and an “ambitious Free Trade Agreement” suggests that the next phase of bilateral relations will seek to institutionalise economic interdependence at the same level that defence cooperation has achieved over the past three decades.
India’s UN Voting and the Tension with Bilateral Warmth
The apparent contradiction between India’s UN vote criticising Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank and the Prime Minister’s solidarity address to the Knesset reflects a structural tension in Indian foreign policy. India uses multilateral forums to maintain its historical credentials as a champion of international law, the rights of post-colonial states, and the Palestinian cause — constituencies that matter to India’s relationships with the Arab world, Africa, and the broader Global South.
Simultaneously, bilateral engagement with Israel is driven by strategic and economic interests that operate on a different logic. This dual-track approach is not unique to India — several European countries and the United States itself maintain this tension — but managing it requires sophisticated diplomacy and clear communication of India’s core principles to all parties.
Way Forward
India should pursue the finalisation of the India-Israel Free Trade Agreement as a priority, leveraging the current diplomatic momentum. Simultaneously, India must sustain its engagement with the Palestinian Authority and ensure that its support for the Gaza Peace Initiative is backed by concrete humanitarian contributions, including medical supplies, reconstruction assistance, and diplomatic support for Palestinian civil governance structures. India should use its G20 presidency legacy and its current UNSC engagement credentials to advocate for a ceasefire framework that addresses both Israel’s legitimate security concerns and Palestinian rights under international law.
Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations
This topic is directly relevant for UPSC GS-II under India’s foreign policy, bilateral relations, international organisations, and important international institutions. It is also relevant for GS-III under defence and security, and for the Essay paper under themes of India’s strategic autonomy and multi-vector foreign policy. For SSC examinations, it covers India’s diplomatic history, international relations, and defence cooperation.
Key terms: De-hyphenation policy, Abraham Accords, SIPRI arms data, UN Security Council, Gaza Peace Initiative, two-state solution, India-Israel FTA, Strategic Partnership, Digital Public Infrastructure.