Meta Title: Simultaneous Elections Bill India 2024 — UPSC Current Affairs Analysis | One Nation One Election
Meta Description: Deep analysis of India’s Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill 2024 on simultaneous elections, JPC findings, constitutional concerns, federal structure impact, and UPSC SSC relevance. Read complete current affairs article.
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Focus Keyword: Simultaneous Elections Bill India UPSC
Secondary Keywords: One Nation One Election, Constitution 129th Amendment Bill, JPC simultaneous elections, UPSC current affairs 2026, concurrent elections India
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At The Hindu MIND event on February 20, 2026, P.P. Chaudhary, BJP Member of Parliament and Chairperson of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) examining the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024, made a wide-ranging defence of simultaneous elections while simultaneously admitting that the Bill in its present form carries significant legal infirmities. This candid acknowledgment from the very person entrusted with steering the legislation through parliamentary scrutiny underlines the complexity of what is arguably the most ambitious electoral reform proposal in post-independence India — a proposal that touches the foundations of constitutional democracy, federalism, parliamentary accountability, and electoral logistics simultaneously.
The concept of “One Nation, One Election” — conducting simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies — is not new. It was the norm in India from 1951 to 1967. But after the premature dissolution of several State Assemblies in 1968-69, the electoral cycle fragmented, and India entered a permanent cycle of staggered elections. The Ram Nath Kovind High-Level Committee, constituted in September 2023, examined the proposal comprehensively and submitted its report in March 2024, recommending a phased synchronisation. The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024 was subsequently introduced in Parliament and referred to a JPC for detailed examination. The JPC has since held 16 meetings, consulting a wide range of witnesses including six former Chief Justices of India.
Understanding this debate thoroughly — its constitutional dimensions, economic arguments, federal concerns, logistical challenges, and democratic implications — is essential for any serious UPSC aspirant.
Table of Contents
Five Important Key Points
- The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024 proposes synchronising elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Assemblies, reviving a practice that existed in India from 1951 to 1967 before the electoral cycle fragmented.
- The JPC Chairperson admitted the Bill has “many infirmities” including excessive and potentially arbitrary powers granted to the Election Commission under Section 82A(5), which uses the subjective word “opinion” without requiring objective criteria or mandatory judicial review.
- The economic argument — estimated recurring loss of 1.6% of GDP (approximately ₹7 lakh crore) due to frequent elections, per a paper presented to the Kovind Committee — forms the primary justification advanced by proponents.
- Critics argue the Bill undermines basic structure elements including parliamentary democracy, federal polity, and the accountability mechanism inherent in no-confidence motions, effectively importing a semi-presidential system through the backdoor.
- The Bill requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament for constitutional amendment and ratification by at least half the State Legislatures, making its passage a significant political challenge given current parliamentary arithmetic.
Historical Background: From Synchronised to Fragmented Elections
India’s first four general elections — held in 1951-52, 1957, 1962, and 1967 — were conducted simultaneously for both Parliament and State Assemblies. This synchronisation was not a deliberate constitutional design but a practical outcome of the political landscape of early independent India, where the Indian National Congress dominated both national and state politics, maintaining stable governments across the country.
The synchronisation began breaking down after the 1967 elections, which produced hung assemblies in several states and led to political defections, coalition collapses, and mid-term dissolutions. By 1971, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called early Lok Sabha elections riding on the “Garibi Hatao” wave, the decoupling of parliamentary and assembly election cycles was complete. Since then, India has effectively been in a state of perpetual electoral activity, with some state or local body election occurring in virtually every quarter of every year.
The Law Commission of India in its 170th Report (1999) first formally recommended a return to simultaneous elections. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice also examined the idea in 2015. The Kovind Committee’s 2024 report — after consulting over 47 political parties, constitutional experts, economists, and election administrators — provided the most comprehensive recent examination, recommending a two-phase implementation: first synchronising Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections, then bringing local body elections into alignment within 100 days.
Constitutional Provisions and the Amendment Architecture
The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill proposes amending several constitutional provisions to achieve and maintain electoral synchronisation. The core mechanism involves establishing a fixed “appointed date” — likely tied to the date of the first sitting of a newly elected Lok Sabha — toward which all State Assembly terms would be progressively aligned, potentially through curtailed initial terms for some assemblies.
The constitutional amendments required are substantial. Article 83 (duration of Houses of Parliament), Article 85 (dissolution of Lok Sabha), Article 172 (duration of State Legislatures), Article 174 (dissolution of State Assemblies), and Article 356 (President’s Rule) would all need modification. Additionally, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 would require corresponding amendments to align election scheduling provisions.
The amendment procedure under Article 368 requires a special majority — two-thirds of members present and voting in each House of Parliament, provided this constitutes more than half the total membership. For provisions affecting the federal structure — specifically those relating to State Legislature terms — ratification by the legislatures of not less than half the States is additionally required under the proviso to Article 368(2). This is a very high political threshold, particularly given that several major States are currently governed by opposition parties that are on record opposing the Bill.
The Economic Argument: Strengths and Limitations
The primary argument advanced by proponents — and emphasised by JPC Chairperson P.P. Chaudhary — is economic. The estimate of a recurring GDP loss of 1.6% annually (approximately ₹7 lakh crore) due to frequent elections, attributed to a paper by former Finance Commission Chairman N.K. Singh and economics professor Prachi Mishra presented to the Kovind Committee, is the centrepiece of this case.
The economic costs cited include the direct cost of conducting elections — estimated by the ECI at approximately ₹10,000-12,000 crore per general election cycle — deployment of government school teachers for election duty disrupting academic calendars, the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) freezing policy announcements and government programs for extended periods in affected states, delayed foreign direct investment as investors wait for political clarity, and diversion of administrative attention from development work to electoral management.
These are genuine costs. The MCC’s restrictive effect on policy implementation is particularly significant — a State under election MCC cannot announce new welfare schemes, make major government appointments, or undertake large public works during the election period, which can extend for two to three months. When multiple states are under MCC simultaneously, the aggregate policy paralysis is substantial.
However, the economic argument has important limitations that the JPC’s examination must honestly confront. First, the 1.6% GDP loss estimate is not independently verified and conflates costs of elections with broader political uncertainty costs that would persist regardless of election synchronisation. Second, the MCC applies not just to areas going to polls but has differential application across the country, meaning simultaneous elections could create a single prolonged MCC period of much greater national impact than the current staggered approach. Third, elections also generate economic activity — employment for election workers, increased consumer spending, political advertising revenue — that partially offsets direct costs.
Constitutional Concerns: Basic Structure and Federal Compact
The most serious objections to the simultaneous elections proposal are constitutional rather than logistical. Critics argue that the Bill, by restricting the tenure of State Assemblies to align with a centrally determined “appointed date,” fundamentally alters the relationship between the electorate and its elected representatives in ways that undermine the basic structure of the Constitution.
The basic structure doctrine, established in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), holds that certain fundamental features of the Constitution — including democratic governance, parliamentary democracy, federalism, and separation of powers — cannot be amended even through the Article 368 procedure. The question of whether mandatory synchronisation of State Assembly elections with national electoral cycles violates this doctrine is genuinely contested.
The federal concern is particularly acute. India’s Constitution establishes a quasi-federal structure with a strong Centre, but State Legislatures derive their democratic legitimacy independently from their electorates. Curtailing a State Legislature’s term — even by a year or two — to achieve synchronisation with the Lok Sabha cycle imposes a nationally determined constraint on State-level democracy that has no parallel in the current constitutional design. It effectively subordinates State electoral autonomy to a centrally managed schedule, which critics argue is structurally inconsistent with the federal character of the Constitution.
The no-confidence motion dimension adds further complexity. P.P. Chaudhary himself acknowledged that the Bill is currently silent on what happens if a government falls mid-term after synchronisation is achieved. The JPC is examining the “remainder term” principle — whereby fresh elections after a mid-term collapse would be held only for the remaining term of the synchronised cycle rather than for a full five years. While this mechanism exists in Panchayati Raj institutions and has been upheld by the Supreme Court, its application to State Assemblies and Parliament is constitutionally novel and democratically controversial.
The most pointed critique, raised by opposition members and constitutional scholars, is that restricting no-confidence motions — even implicitly through the “remainder term” deterrent — effectively weakens parliamentary accountability and creates conditions resembling a presidential system of government without the constitutional safeguards that presidential systems incorporate.
The Election Commission’s Powers: A Critical Infirmity
One of the most significant concerns identified within the JPC itself — including by its own Chairperson — relates to Section 82A(5) of the proposed legislation, which empowers the Election Commission to recommend to the President that a particular State Assembly election be conducted at a “later date” if, in the Commission’s “opinion,” simultaneous conduct is not feasible.
The word “opinion” — without the requirement of objective criteria, recorded reasons, or mandatory judicial review — gives the ECI potentially unchecked discretion to decouple particular State elections from the synchronised cycle. Several former Chief Justices of India who appeared before the JPC expressed concern that this provision could be misused — whether by a politically partisan Commission or through external pressure — to selectively delay elections in politically inconvenient states.
This concern is not theoretical. The Election Commission’s credibility has been a subject of public debate, and the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) — which directed that a collegium comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India should appoint Election Commissioners — reflects the judiciary’s own concern about the Commission’s institutional independence. Vesting broad discretionary powers in the ECI without adequate safeguards, precisely when its appointment process has been a matter of constitutional controversy, is a significant governance risk.
Logistical and Administrative Challenges
Beyond constitutional concerns, the practical logistics of simultaneous elections present enormous administrative challenges. India currently uses approximately 5.5 million Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) for a general election. Simultaneous elections would require nearly double this number, given that voters in most constituencies would need to cast votes on two separate EVMs — one for Parliament and one for the State Assembly. Chaudhary’s optimistic estimate that procuring additional EVMs worth ₹10,000-15,000 crore is manageable given India’s ₹55 lakh crore Budget deserves scrutiny — the challenge is not merely financial but involves manufacturing capacity, quality testing, secure storage, and maintenance of a vastly expanded EVM fleet.
Security force deployment for simultaneous elections would require concentrating the entire central paramilitary force deployment in one period rather than spreading it across the year, creating significant law and order management challenges. Training election officials, managing voter education campaigns, and ensuring accessibility across the country’s diverse geographic terrain simultaneously would test administrative capacity in ways that staggered elections currently do not.
Way Forward: Reform With Constitutional Fidelity
A constitutionally defensible approach to electoral reform need not be all-or-nothing. Several intermediate reforms can reduce the costs of frequent elections without requiring constitutional amendments of such far-reaching scope. Establishing fixed election dates within a five-year window — rather than allowing governments to manipulate election timing for political advantage — would itself reduce uncertainty. Rationalising the MCC to apply only to constituencies actually going to polls, rather than entire states, would significantly reduce its policy-freeze effect. Strengthening the common electoral roll for Parliament, State Assemblies, and local bodies — already partially implemented — reduces administrative duplication.
If simultaneous elections are pursued, the constitutional amendments must explicitly address: the fate of governments that fall mid-term, the conditions under which the ECI can decouple State elections from the cycle (with mandatory objective criteria and judicial review), the protection of State Legislature sovereignty, and the mechanism for the initial transition.
Relevance for UPSC and SSC Examinations
This topic is among the most examination-relevant in recent years. For UPSC GS Paper II, it directly covers constitutional amendments (Article 368), federal structure, parliamentary democracy, the Election Commission’s powers (Article 324), and electoral reforms. The basic structure doctrine connection makes it relevant for constitutional law questions in both Mains and the Law Optional. For GS Paper III, the economic cost of frequent elections connects to governance efficiency and public expenditure management. For the Essay paper, themes like “Electoral Reforms and Democratic Accountability” or “Federalism Under Stress in Contemporary India” are directly informed by this debate. For SSC examinations, key facts — the Bill’s name and number, JPC composition, the Kovind Committee, the 1951-1967 synchronisation history, and the constitutional articles involved — are important current affairs points. Aspirants should note that this is a live legislative process and must track JPC recommendations when published.